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Abstract 
 
The US military has identified Human Performance Modeling (HPM) as a significant 
requirement and challenge of future systems modeling and analysis initiatives. To support 
this goal, Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) has undertaken a program of HPM as an 
integral augmentation to its system-of-system (SoS) analytics capabilities. The previous 
effort, reported in SAND2005-6569, evaluated the effects of soldier cognitive fatigue on 
SoS performance. The current effort began with a very broad survey of any performance-
shaping factors (PSFs) that also might affect soldiers’ performance in combat situations. 
The work included consideration of three different approaches to cognition modeling and 
how appropriate they would be for application to SoS analytics. This bulk of this report 
categorizes 47 PSFs into three groups (internal, external, and task-related) and provides 
brief descriptions of how each affects combat performance, according to the literature. 
The PSFs were then assembled into a matrix with 22 representative military tasks and 
assigned one of four levels of estimated negative impact on task performance, based on 
the literature. Blank versions of the matrix were then sent to two ex-military subject-
matter experts to be filled out based on their personal experiences. Data analysis was 
performed to identify the consensus most influential PSFs. Results indicate that combat-
related injury, cognitive fatigue, inadequate training, physical fatigue, thirst, stress, poor 
perceptual processing, and presence of chemical agents are among the PSFs with the 
most negative impact on combat performance.
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1. Introduction 
Current system of systems (SoS) analysis efforts at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) 
capture multiple performance attributes of military hardware systems, such as mobility 
and lethality in the context of user-defined scenarios. This capability is state-of-the-art 
and unique to SNL. However, the analysis capability is focused primarily on combat 
technological and sustainment systems; the contributions and performance capabilities of 
human operators are not included. The problem with this approach is that humans fight 
wars, not machines. Platforms must be driven into position and operated by humans to 
wage war. The truth of the matter is that research on human reliability in the military 
informs us that at least 50 percent of system failures are attributable to human error 
(Ref.1). In systems of high consequence and safety regulation, such as commercial 
airlines and nuclear power, the system failures attributable to human error is significantly 
higher. Not including humans in a SoS analysis will likely lead to overlook the largest 
performance factor of the SoS simulation. With no human element represented, it would 
be equivalent to assuming all soldiers performed perfectly all the time. This assumption 
inevitably leads to the overly optimistic (i.e. non-conservative) results in availability or 
performance analyses. As the human elements of SoS models become more realistic by 
reflecting the effects of the environment, weather, adversary actions, and intrinsic soldier 
variables on soldier performance, and hence system performance, the results of SoS 
analyses will become increasingly more accurate. 
 
Last year (FY05) the authors investigated what they thought to be the most influential 
performance-shaping factor1 (PSF) or behavior modifier, in military scenarios, soldier 
cognitive fatigue (Ref. 2). A simplistic, stepwise model of soldier fatigue was 
incorporated into a SoS analysis with dramatic effect. The operational unavailability of 
C2V platforms rose by 30% when it was assumed that soldiers performed the 72-hour 
mission without sleep. Having proven the importance of soldier fatigue on system 
availability, the current report addresses a wide spectrum of combat-related PSFs other 
than cognitive fatigue that could significantly impact operational availability and 
performance in large military SoS analyses. 
 
2. Recent Advances in Human Performance 
Modeling 
 
In the last two and a half decades significant effort has been put into developing models 
that mimic human cognitive behavior for the purposes of military modeling and 
simulation (M&S). While it is beyond the scope of this report to summarize all of the 
work, there are several summaries available in the literature that stand out as authoritative 
                                                 
1 SNL researchers have traditionally used the term “performance-shaping factor”, however the bulk of the 
military researchers in this area use the term “behavior moderator.” We will use the former term and its 
intialism, PSF, throughout this report. 
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sources. First and foremost is Pew and Mavor’s 1998 text (Ref. 3). While it is now 
somewhat dated, it has remained a solid source reporting the findings of a blue-ribbon 
panel organized by the National Research Council charged with studying the state-of-the-
art in human-performance modeling (HPM) relating to military M&S of cognition, team, 
and organizational behavior. Pew and Mavor describe and review all of the major 
integrative architectures extant at the time, including ACT-R, COGNET, EPIC, HOS, 
MicroSAINT, MIDAS, OMAR, SAMPLE, and SOAR. They also address topics 
prevalent in the need to model human behavior in military contexts, such as decision-
making, situation awareness, planning, learning and memory, attention and multitasking, 
and unit-level modeling. 
 
The two most popular and most reviewed cognitive architectures are ACT-R and SOAR. 
The following descriptions of ACT-R and SOAR were provided by Michael L. Bernard 
of SNL in a recent personal correspondence. 
 
2.1  ACT-R 
 
The original purpose of ACT-R2 was to model problem solving and learning (for 
example, predicting the degree and speed of learning when operating a novel operating 
system). Because of this focus, modeling of the effects (limitations) of working and long-
term memory is emphasized. ACT-R is a production-system theory that models the steps 
of cognition by a sequence of production rules that fire to coordinate retrieval of 
information from the environment and from “memory.” There are two types of 
knowledge representation in ACT-R—declarative and procedural knowledge. In ACT-R, 
declarative knowledge is represented in structure called chunks whereas procedural 
knowledge is represented in productions. Chunks and productions are the basic building 
blocks of an ACT-R model. 
 
ACT-R generally consists of a goal stack that encodes the hierarchy of intentional 
guiding behavior, a procedural memory containing production rules, and a declarative 
memory containing chunks of information. These are all organized through the current 
goal that represents the focus of attention. The current goal can be temporarily suspended 
when a new goal is pushed on the stack. Productions are selected to fire through a 
conflict resolution process that chooses one production from among the productions that 
match the current goal. Productions consist of a series of condition-action pairs of “if-
then” rules. Conditions specify a pattern of chunks that must be present in the buffers for 
the production rule to apply. The interface between procedural memory and other 
components are accomplished through buffers. Each buffer can hold one chuck at a time, 
and the actions of a production affect the contents of the buffers. A buffer consists of a 
set of patterns to match against the current buffers’ contents. If all of the patterns 
correctly match, then the production is said to match and can be selected.  
 
 
                                                 
2 ACT-R stands for Adaptive Control of Thought 
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(P example-counting English Description 
   =goal> If   the goal is 
      isa         count   to count 
      state       counting   the current state is counting 
      number       =num1   there is a number we will call =num1 
   =retrieval>   and a chunk has been retrieved 
      isa         count-order   of type count-order 
      first       =num1   where the first number is =num1 
      second      =num2   and it is followed by another  
    number we will call =num2 
==> Then 
   =goal>   change the goal 
      number       =num2   to continue counting from =num2 
   +retrieval>   and request a retrieval 
      isa         count-order   of a count-order fact 
      first       =num2   for the number that follows =num2 
 
A chunk can be created explicitly in the initial conditions for the model, as the result of a 
perceptual request, or as a new goal. Every chunk in ACT-R has a numerical value called 
activation. The activation reflects the degree to which past experiences and current 
context indicate that chunk will be useful at any particular moment. When a retrieval 
request is made, the chunk with the greatest activation among those that match the 
specifications of the request will be the one placed into the retrieval buffer.  
 
2.1.1 ACT-R’s Strengths and Weaknesses 
 
While ACT-R is a powerful cognitive computational architecture, which can be used in 
training research, there are several limitations to this approach. ACT-R rests on the 
theory of unified cognition, and like most theories, it is constantly being revised and 
updated as further empirical data is gathered. While the general architecture of ACT-R 
was state-of-the-art 20 years ago, newer models of cognition have been developed. ACT-
R can be difficult to learn and it can be an arduous process to build a model of a complex 
task. For example, the modeler has to input the declarative memory and the productions 
in order to build the model. For complex tasks, this may require a hundred productions or 
more, which can be a time consuming process. Moreover, the current iteration of the 
model does not include emotions or higher-level goals.  
 
2.2  SOAR 
 
Like ACT-R, SOAR3 is an attempt to build a unified theory of cognition. SOAR seeks to 
describe and realize the fundamental, functional components of intelligence. In the last 10 
years, much of SOAR research has focused on building intelligent systems that interact 
autonomously with complex environments that are inhabited by other entities, including 
other intelligent agents and human agents. The continuing thread of SOAR research has 
been to search for a minimal set of mechanisms that are sufficient to realize the complete 
range of intelligent behavior. 
                                                 
3 SOAR stands for State, Operator and Result. 
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SOAR uses an associative mechanism to identify knowledge relevant to current problems 
and to bring that knowledge to bear on potential solutions. A symbolic pattern matcher 
compares a representation of the current context to the activation conditions for each 
element in the system's knowledge base. Any relevant knowledge activates, leading to 
further elaboration of the context. The agent’s reasoning context includes its current 
beliefs about the state of the world, proposals to perform different tasks, actions to be 
executed, etc. Thus, the flow of control in SOAR is determined by the associations made 
in memory. Because many of these associations can be made independently from each 
other, SOAR allows them to occur in parallel. The functional role of parallelism is that 
many types of relevant knowledge can be brought to bear on a problem. Thus, for a single 
problem, a SOAR agent can simultaneously consider problem decomposition, analogy, 
experimentation, or other solution methods. 
 
SOAR employs a computationally inexpensive truth maintenance algorithm to update 
beliefs about the world. For example, a pilot agent might believe that an enemy aircraft is 
pointed at it. This belief would have been derived from environmental inputs such as the 
enemy heading. When the enemy’s heading changes, the agent will automatically update 
its belief about the enemy.  
 
While it is useful to be able to choose between options, an agent could find itself in a 
situation where it recognizes no available options or cannot decide between options. 
SOAR recognizes such a conflict, marks it as a reasoning “impasse”, and automatically 
creates a sub-goal to resolve the impasse. This automatically generates a new problem 
context on which the agent can bring new knowledge to bear. The agent might use 
planning knowledge to consider possible futures and determine an appropriate course of 
action. It might make a choice by comparing this situation to others it knows about and 
then drawing an analogy. Automatic sub-goaling gives SOAR agents a meta-level 
“reasoning” capability, the ability to reason about their own reasoning. Further, SOAR's 
meta-level reasoning is not a separate component of the overall system. 
 
In addition to not knowing what to do, or how to select among alternatives, an agent may 
be faced with knowing what it wants to do, but not having any immediate operational 
way to achieve that goal. For example, once a pilot agent decides to intercept a particular 
target, it still must make a series of decisions about how to prosecute the intercept. This 
situation also results in an impasse in SOAR. In this case, there is a selected commitment, 
and the impasse (of not having an immediate way to achieve that commitment) creates a 
goal to find a way to achieve it. The impasse goal corresponds to a task goal, such as 
“execute a mission” or “intercept a target”. Importantly, SOAR makes a distinction 
between the goal itself and how the goal is achieved. Thus, the same goal can be attacked 
in different ways at different times, depending on the situation.  
 
Automatic sub-goaling enables task decomposition. At each step in the decomposition, 
the agent is able to focus its knowledge on the particular options at just that level and 
ignore considerations at other levels. The process of decomposition narrows a potentially 
exponential number of considerations into a much smaller set of choices, which is 
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important for agents that have finite computational resources and that must remain 
reactive to the environment. Recognizing and focusing on only knowledge appropriate to 
the current problem is the essence of the problem space hypothesis, one of SOAR's 
theoretical foundations. 
 
2.2.1  SOAR’s Strengths and Weaknesses 
 
SOAR's mechanism of adaptation is both conceptually simple and powerful. All impasses 
represent a lack of immediately applicable knowledge. However, once the agent reflects 
and comes to a decision that resolves the impasse, it summarizes and generalizes the 
reasoning that occurred during the impasse. This process results in new knowledge that 
will allow the agent to avoid an impasse when encountering a similar situation. SOAR's 
learning mechanism has been used to: learn new conceptual knowledge, learn new 
procedures, and correct its knowledge as it gains feedback through experience in its 
environment. There is a variety of different styles of learning that an intelligent agent 
might exhibit. Past research demonstrates that SOAR’s simple generalization method can 
implement many of these styles. The research hypothesis is that SOAR’s method can 
implement all of them. However, the precise way to implement some styles of learning is 
still a research question, and even some well-understood methods are still difficult to 
implement in individual SOAR agents. Other adaptive intelligent architectures 
pragmatically finesse the difficulty of having a single, primitive method for adaptation by 
directly implementing a variety of high-level learning styles. 
 
The downside of the SOAR approach is that, by dictating very general mechanisms, it 
under-specifies the capabilities that must be built into intelligent agents. Most of an 
agent’s competence arises from the encoded knowledge (i.e., the set of rules) that 
SOAR’s mechanisms operate on. Thus, agent knowledge must be created to realize any 
high-level intelligent behavior. For instance, SOAR has been used to build planning 
systems. In comparison to other AI planning systems, SOAR offers little immediately 
evident power. SOAR only specifies very low-level constraints on how planning can 
occur, so SOAR agent designers must develop their own plan languages and algorithms, 
while these are provided in most planning systems. However, what SOAR does provide 
is a natural, scalable methodology for integrating planning with plan execution -- as well 
as natural language understanding, reasoning by analogy, etc. Too often, AI researchers 
develop powerful single-purpose systems that then create new problems when different 
subsystems must be integrated to realize a complete intelligent agent. By focusing on a 
uniform substrate that allows knowledge to mediate any decision, SOAR provides a 
ready tool with which to realize integrated approaches. SOAR therefore trades off 
powerful, but overly constrained processes for the flexibility to integrate solutions.  
 
2.3  Sandia’s Cognitive Modeling Framework 
 
More recently, J. Christopher Forsythe and colleagues at SNL have developed a cognitive 
framework that models how an individual sees the world, associates concepts, and 
responds to patterns of complex stimuli. Unlike the former models that represented a 
generic human performer (ACT-R, MIDAS, SOAR), the SNL approach grounds each 
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model in conceptual/associative data taken from an individual, customizing each 
representation to a particular person’s knowledge and conceptual associations. It has also 
been used to represent a cognitive collective, a group of individuals who need to perform 
a group task, such as evaluating applicants as security threats. The SNL approach has 
been successful in modeling individuals responding to air-combat threats, simulating 
security officers’ responses to facility intruders, and reflecting individuals’ pattern-
analysis styles in a collective task of recognizing a security threat from mined behavioral 
data. The following description of the Sandia Cognitive Model Framework was provided 
by J. Chris Forsythe in a recent personal correspondence. 
 
The Sandia cognitive framework is a modular software architecture that includes various 
component classes needed to construct human-like computational cognitive models. The 
component classes correspond to functional subsystems essential to construct a cognitive 
model. Figure 1 shows the modules and their associations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of Sandia’s Cognitive Model Framework. 
 
A key component is context recognition. This component utilizes the activation of 
concepts within semantic memory to recognize patterns learned through past experiences. 
From an engineering perspective, the context recognition component is a type of 
Nonlinear Dynamical System (NDS). The inputs to the NDS are processed sensory inputs 
and the outputs are estimated activation levels of the various contexts as a function of 
time. The estimated context activations can be considered a trajectory through the state 
space of the NDS. Other components of the framework include episodic memory for 
capturing a record of past experiences that provides the basis for context acquisition, 
spatial memory, which allows the recognition of contexts to be influenced by the location 
of events (i.e. geospatial coordinates of images) and a comparator that detects and 
responds to anomalous events. 
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The basic unit in our cognitive framework is the ‘concept.” Concepts correspond to the 
most elementary units of cognition enabling an entity to recognize and respond to stimuli. 
Within this framework, cognition begins with recognition of meaningful regularities 
within an entity’s sensory experience of their external and/or internal world. These 
regularities may involve almost any stimuli detectable to the entity’s sense organs, as 
well as combinations of stimuli that may span sensory modalities and temporal durations. 
 
Many factors may contribute to a regularity being meaningful. These include association 
with reward, predictive value, causative relationship, distinguishing attribute, cue in 
guiding motor processes, etc. The foregoing assumes an ability to acquire meaningful 
regularities and retain the knowledge needed for their subsequent recognition. Once 
learned, the internal representations of these regularities correspond to the concepts that 
serve as the basic unit for cognitive processes. 
 
2.3.1  Semantic Memory 
 
Within the cognitive framework, knowledge of concepts (i.e., regularities) is represented 
within semantic memory. However, an additional function of semantic memory is to store 
knowledge of the “relatedness” of concepts. Relatedness refers to the awareness that two 
concepts are somehow associated whether one is a property of the other, they are 
members of the same category, they operate together in some functional relationship, etc.  
2.3.2 Context Recognition 
 
Everyday experience is more than a complex array of differential concept activations. 
Instead, we recognize patterns within this complex array. Within the cognitive modeling 
framework, we have referred to these patterns as “contexts.”  
 
At a given moment in time, the overall experience of the world may consist of the 
somewhat separable experiences that I’m in my home, in my kitchen and eating 
breakfast. Home, kitchen and eating breakfast may each represent a context. If we 
consider any one of these contexts, there are corresponding concepts (e.g., morning, 
orange juice, cereal, wearing pajamas, reading the newspaper, etc.)  Each of these 
concepts is predictive of the context “eating breakfast,” but in isolation, it is unlikely that 
any of these concepts alone would be sufficient for a meaningful inference. However, to 
the extent that the concepts present in a given scenario correspond to the pattern 
associated with the context “eating breakfast,” it may be inferred that the context is 
“eating breakfast.” As illustrated, a given scenario may consist of multiple contexts that 
occur simultaneously (e.g., in my home, in my kitchen and eating breakfast). 
Additionally, contexts may involve differing levels of abstraction (e.g., in my home and 
in my kitchen). 
 
Context recognition occurs through a process based on evidence accumulation. Here, the 
relevance (i.e., evidence derived from the activation of concepts within semantic 
memory) of contexts to the current situation is continually updated. Transitions between 
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contexts occur when evidence for a context exceeds or falls below the threshold for 
recognition. The experience of a given situation is then based on the combination of 
contexts that each exceeds some threshold for recognition.  
 
There is an additional feature of the context recognition mechanisms that should be 
mentioned. There is knowledge accompanying contexts that concerns “expectations.” 
Knowledge of expectations consists of concepts that are likely to occur in conjunction 
with a context. For example, coffee would be an expectation for the context “eating 
breakfast.” Consequently, given other concepts provide sufficient evidence for 
recognition that the context is “eating breakfast,” any dark liquid within sufficient 
proximity is likely to be perceived to be coffee. Expectations correspond to a “top-down” 
influence and lead to a priming of concepts in semantic memory, which may occur 
despite an absence of corresponding sensory events, following recognition of a given 
context. 
2.3.3  Episodic Memory 
 
As we progress through life, we create a record of our experiences. This record is referred 
to as episodic or autobiographical memory. Here we make a distinction in that episodic 
memory refers to the actual record of events stored to memory, whereas autobiographical 
memory refers to the recall that occurs as a product of constructive processes involved in 
accessing the episodic record.  
 
Our own instantiation of episodic memory consists of a record of experience based on the 
activation of other components of the model. The record is not continuous, but instead, 
certain events may trigger an entry to episodic memory. For instance, entries correspond 
to the recognition of a context or the transition from one context to another. Likewise, 
activation of concepts in semantic memory may also trigger an entry, as well as 
activation of other components that have not yet been described (i.e., comparator and 
emotional processes). An entry to episodic memory consists of a reference to items 
activated at the time corresponding to the entry and a record of the relative activation of 
each item. For instance, with semantic memory, this would consist of the concepts that 
were activated and their relative levels of activation.  
 
The contents of episodic memory are not stored as distinct episodes with clearly defined 
beginnings and ends, but instead episodic memory is represented as a continuous record 
of events. For any given point in time, the episodic record may consist of several 
simultaneously activated contexts. “Episodes” are a product of episodic memory 
retrieval. Based on retrieval cues, a slice of the episodic memory record is recalled that 
may have a distinct beginning or end, with the beginning and end typically corresponding 
to transitions associated with particularly salient contexts. Thus, in our framework, 
“episodes” are a product of episodic memory retrieval, and not the basis for structuring 
episodic memory. 
  
Episodic recall utilizes an evidence accumulation-based mechanism similar to that 
previously described for context recognition. In particular, the episodic memory record is 
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evaluated with regard to the relative correspondence to one or more memory retrieval 
cues. For example, if the retrieval cues consist of “baseball game” and “cold night,” the 
episodic record would be evaluated with regard to the correspondence to these cues. 
Periods involving both cues, in general, would receive more evidence than other time 
intervals containing one or neither cue. For periods in which both cues occur, the 
evidence for a time interval would be a function of the level of activation associated with 
each cue during the time interval. For example, if it was an extremely cold night with 
significant discomfort, “cold night” may have been an extremely salient cue.  
 
However, of tremendous significance, the episodic record has a level of “accessibility” 
associated with it that modifies the evidence derived for a given time interval with respect 
to such factors as the amount of time that has passed. Recall occurs for the time interval 
or intervals receiving the most evidence.  
 
At recall, an episode derived from the episodic record may be replayed with activation of 
the constituent elements of the episode. For example, concepts in semantic memory may 
be activated. Similarly, while not incorporated in our current models, given a perceptual 
memory containing rich representations of perceptual entities, these perceptual 
representations would be activated. It is worth noting that the activation of constituent 
elements of episodic memory is somewhat consistent with events as they occurred at the 
time of the episode, but is also a product of current knowledge. As a result, the recalled 
experience may differ in some regards from the original experience.  
 
2.3.4 The Comparator 
 
The comparator within our modeling framework monitors ongoing context recognition 
processes and maintains an awareness of current contexts, including expectations 
associated with each context. The comparator also monitors semantic memory and the 
concepts that are activated. The comparator is triggered when one or more concepts are 
activated in semantic memory, which are inconsistent with the current context(s). 
Additionally, an adjustable threshold is provided that allows the model to be more or less 
sensitive to out-of-context events to enable situational influences (e.g., lowered 
sensitivity following positive events or successful goal attainment and heightened 
sensitivity following negative events or failed goal attainment) or individual differences. 
 
When the comparator is triggered, there is heightened attention placed on the out-of-
context event. This occurs through a boost in activation for the out-of-context concept in 
semantic memory accompanied by a generalized dampening of the activation of all other 
concepts. As a result, in some cases, the model may abandon the context that had been 
previously recognized. In other cases, the evidence may be sufficient that a recognized 
context is not abandoned despite the out-of-context event, although the experience may 
prompt learning that incorporates the previously out-of-context event, or acquisition of a 
new context. 
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2.3.5  Emotional Processes 
 
Our modeling framework has made provisions for separate components that each 
correspond to distinct emotional processes. For instance, a model may be configured that 
has distinct components for emotions corresponding to pleasure, dysphoria, frustration-
anger, fear, anxiety and disgust. Each emotion may have a behavioral correlate, but in the 
current framework the greatest impact of emotional processes occurs through its 
influence on information processing.  
 
Concepts within semantic memory and contexts within contextual knowledge may be 
associated with an emotional process. For example, the concept “snake” may be 
associated with the emotional process corresponding to fear. When the concept “snake” is 
activated, this triggers the emotional process corresponding to fear. As a result, similar to 
the comparator described above, there is a heightened activation of the concept that 
triggered the emotional response accompanied by a generalized inhibition of other 
concepts. This serves to focus attention on the fear-inducing stimulus to the exclusion of 
other concepts and may prompt a reinterpretation of the ongoing context. 
 
2.3.6  Sandia’s Cognitive Model’s Strengths and Weaknesses 
 
A primary strength of the Sandia cognitive framework is its emphasis on context 
recognition. This makes the framework particularly well suited for modeling cognitive 
processes that involve pattern recognition, intuitive judgment and implicit knowledge. 
The framework has been tailored to support automated knowledge capture providing the 
unique utility of being able to quickly and easily derive models of specific individuals. 
Furthermore, the framework has been implemented in a variety of practical applications 
that involve integration with tools for automated knowledge capture. 
 
However, the Sandia approach is not a generic model, but one that is populated by an 
individual’s concept structure. Thus, the model cannot simply applied to represent an 
entity without first collecting personal data and populating the model. To date, there has 
been limited experimental validation of the Sandia cognitive framework. While the 
framework emphasizes context recognition, it currently has no mechanism to represent 
deliberative processes or executive functions. Finally, the framework is an experimental 
platform with limited availability outside of Sandia that requires significant time 
investment to begin using. Thus, it has not benefited from there being a community of 
users and developers, as exists with other modeling frameworks. 
 
2.4  Simplified Approach Needed 
 
The common trait in the models and architectures referred to above is that they attempt to 
model the performance of an individual performing a task or set of tasks, given 
environmental conditions and input information. While this level of complexity and detail 
is appropriate for evaluating new system designs or graphical user interfaces, it can be 
computationally overwhelming for applications where thousands of humans are needed, 
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such as in a SoS analysis of a US Army brigade, or in Future-Combat Systems (FCS) 
parlance, a Unit of Action (UA). Even if it were computationally tractable, each soldier’s 
conceptual world model would need to be populated from collected data, and situational 
inputs would be required for all of the soldiers represented in the modeled scenario. This 
approach may be the most valid for the few soldiers (high ranking officers) in decision-
making roles in the SoS analysis, who make critical decisions regarding the direction of 
the simulation. In a UA, approximately 9 percent of the forces are officers and the 
remaining 91 percent are infantry and armor specialists. One approach to be considered is 
modeling the top-level UA decision-makers with cognitive models. 
 
2.4.1  Human-Reliability Modeling Assumptions 
 
One notion of looking at soldier performance is that if there were no PSFs in effect, the 
soldier would perform all tasks perfectly, that is, within time constraints and without 
errors. This is analogous to the previous state of SoS analysis, where there was no 
modeling of human elements. This approach is also analogous to equipment reliability 
and availability assumptions—that is, when no faults are extant, performance is as 
designed, no better, no worse. The notion of a perfect soldier gives us a conceptual 
baseline to which we can compare more realistic estimates of soldier performance. That 
is, as more PSFs take effect and get modeled, we would expect more negative impact on 
[perfect] soldier performance. While we realize that on rare occasions acts of heroism and 
feats of superior performance can sway the balance of a battle, these anomalies are 
extremely rare and difficult to model. Perhaps the assumption that, under ideal 
circumstances, all soldiers perform their tasks on time and without errors, balances the 
inability to model the occasional act of superior performance. 
 
2.4.2  Our Strategy 
 
What is needed is a simpler set of assumptions or models of human performance that is 
less detailed and easier to replicate for thousands of soldier entities in a large SoS 
simulation. The difficult remaining tasks associated with this approach are: 1) identifying 
which PFSs hold significant impact on soldier performance in combat, 2) deciding which 
PSFs have the highest impact on a given set of combat tasks, 3) determining if there are 
interactions among the most significant PSFs that occur simultaneously, 4) finding, 
developing and using valid dose-performance curves in estimating impact of the PSFs on 
soldier performance, and 5) assigning appropriate levels of those factors to the affected 
soldiers during those periods of performance in a combat scenario in an SoS simulation. 
The remainder of this report concentrates on the first two of these tasks. 
 
3. PSFs Addressed in the Literature 
 
Significant efforts have been devoted to attempting to understand the relationships 
between PSFs and performance in military operations, both in peacetime and during 
combat. In the push for combat efficiency, the military services have spent untold 
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millions on selecting people that make better soldiers, training them to be better soldiers, 
and designing war-fighting weapons, equipment, and systems to accommodate human 
capabilities and simplify military tasks. It is no coincidence that the field of human 
factors engineering began with military applications in the 1940s and today is 
institutionalized throughout military system procurement processes. The philosophy is 
that if you take into account the capabilities and limitations of humans while designing 
their equipment and weapons, the improved person-system interface will almost always 
produce better performance. Human factors taken into account for military system design 
usually include physical strength; body size and proportions; cognition (knowledge, 
thinking, and decision-making); perceptual abilities; dexterity, manual control and 
coordination; language skills; circadian factors; and physiological performance in 
extreme environments (e.g. in deep water, high altitude, very hot and cold). The 
following sections provide a brief review of the research literature addressing PSFs and 
their impact on human performance in combat. 
 
3.1 Classification of PSFs 
 
Several authors have attempted to simplify the treatment of PSFs by pointing out that 
there are several basic categories to consider: external, internal and task-specific PSFs 
(Ref.s 3 and 4). “External” PSFs comprise those that originate outside the human and 
typically have negative impacts on performance. These include environmental factors 
such as heat, cold, altitude, toxins, noise, vibration, etc. “Internal” PSFs are those specific 
to the individual, such as intelligence, personality, cognitive styles, expertise, cultural 
values, emotional factors, and preferences. They are difficult to assess and often combine 
in ways that are hard to predict. “Task-specific” PSFs include task history, location of 
engagement, boredom, stress, threats, casualty level, task type, availability of on-site task 
training, interface quality, task-related fatigue, battle conditions, and local casualties 
(Ref. 4). Beginning with section 3.3, three categories of PSFs are discussed in detail. 
 
3.2 The Relationship Between Peacetime 
Measures and Combat Performance  
 
To counteract the negative effects of internal PSFs, the military primarily uses selection 
and training. Selection weeds out undesirable factors that might make a candidate a weak 
or under-performing soldier, while “boot camp” and training attempt to minimize 
interpersonal differences by grinding down the ego and building up a physically rugged, 
team-oriented, command-following, appropriately informed soldier. Regardless, a few 
months of basic training cannot erase all of the individual differences in recruits. Despite 
the untold millions spent preparing soldiers for combat, there are surprisingly few 
peacetime predictors of how well a soldier will perform in combat. 
 
Dover (Ref. 5) studied the relationship of subjective estimates of soldier performance in 
“routine service” and in combat, the differential efficiency of selection scores in 
predicting routine vs. combat performance and the construct structure portraying combat 
soldier performance. Four groups of Israeli Defense Force soldiers were subjects in the 
 20 
 
study. They were evaluated by ratings obtained by their direct commander, as well as 
hard-data measures. Ratings of peacetime and combat performance showed significant, 
but moderately low correlations (r = .40 - .50), with higher correlations for 
professionalism and promotion, but lower correlations for factors such as work regimen 
and discipline. Dover reports a study by King et. al (Ref. 6) correlating 43 West Point 
graduates’ Aptitude for Service Ratings of their last year at West Point (r = .52) and final 
graduation score (r = .43) with combat performance in the Korean War. Grades in applied 
courses, such as tactics and electricity correlated more highly (r = .20, .24) than those for 
academic subjects such as mathematics and English (r = .01, -.02).  
 
Dover’s factor analysis for combat performance of 1279 experienced combat soldiers’ 
scores on a Soldiers Peacetime Performance Evaluation (questionnaire), taken 6 to 12 
months after recruitment produced two factors explaining 65.8% of the variance; 
“promotion, professionalism and prospects for functioning in combat (59%) and “work 
regimen and functional performance” (6.8%). A second factor analysis of soldiers’ scores 
on the Soldiers Combat Performance Evaluation shortly after combat revealed a two-
factor solution explaining 73.4% of the variance. The dominant factor, including test 
items such as calm and collected, courage and coping with dangers, and sticking to the 
goal, was called “combat functioning.”  The second factor included test items including 
performance prior to combat, potential beyond squad leader, and technical and tactical 
abilities, and was called “routine functioning and promotion.”  
 
The conclusion that needs to be drawn from the preceding paragraphs is that we cannot 
assume that because we know something about a soldier’s internal PSFs, such as his/her 
intelligence, marksmanship, aptitude, or strength, that we can assume it will have a 
predictable effect on combat performance. Therefore, in modeling the human elements of 
combat-scenario simulations, we need to put more emphasis on the external and task-
based factors. With this caveat in mind, let us look at various PSFs considered for 
modeling in recent studies. 
 
3.3  External PSFs 
 
As mentioned previously, external PSFs comprise those that originate outside the human, 
including environmental factors such as heat, cold, humidity, altitude, toxins, noise, and 
vibration. Each of these will be looked at in terms of impact on performance. 
 
3.3.1  Heat 
 
Excessive heat in situations where heavy work is performed has been studied extensively 
to help develop protective guidelines for the commercial work force and to understand 
how it affects Army operations (Ref. 7). Dissipating metabolic (body) heat is a complex 
process that depends on the work being performed, acclimatization, the air temperature, 
the radiant heat present, the humidity, air speed, and the clothing being worn. A much 
simpler model is needed. The following guidelines may be applicable to our modeling 
problem. 
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Heavy work can extend for 3.5 hours at a temperature of 82 degrees F before heat 
exhaustion is expected; 2.2 hours at 88 degrees, and 90 minutes at 94 degrees. Military 
STD 1472D limits work at 102 degrees to 30 minutes, but suggests 12 hours is safe at 85 
degrees (Ref. 3). Acclimatized soldiers can withstand the negative effects of heat for 
longer periods, however acclimatization cannot protect them indefinitely (Ref. 8). While 
one would not expect effective work to go from 100% to zero at the time limits 
identified, a set of exposure-performance curves is needed to model the negative effects 
of heat over time.  
 
3.3.2  Cold 
 
Military history teaches us that extremely cold environments can wreak havoc on the best 
planned campaigns. If proper insulated garments are not provided to the troops, frostbite 
and hypothermia can profoundly reduce the effectiveness of the ranks quickly. Cold 
weather has the effect of reducing tactile sensitivity and impairing performance on tasks 
requiring fine manual dexterity, such as the manipulation of knobs, switches, screws, nuts 
and bolts (Ref. 9). Hand-grip strength decreases 21-28% after three hours at -25 degrees 
C. Modern armies typically have thermally protective garments, and other means of 
keeping their soldiers out of extremely cold weather. However, as several authors point 
out, bulky protective clothing (e.g. arctic gloves) often trades the performance 
deterioration due to cold to that due to the lack of manual dexterity from the heavy gloves 
(Ref. 9). Military Standard 1472D limits work at 59 degrees F to four hours, and work at 
freezing to 30 minutes (Ref. 3). Acclimatization can occur within one week, however two 
or three weeks allows for steady-state performance. There is little support in the literature 
for the notion that cold can cause deterioration of morale, anxiety, increased irritability, 
depression, and sleep loss.  
 
3.3.3  Noise 
 
Noise is defined as any unwanted sound. Ambient noise of significant level can be an 
environmental stressor that can be detrimental to cognitive activity and performance. 
People vary enormously in their response to noise and can adapt to continuous 
background noise if below physiologically damaging levels. The primary effect is 
annoyance. Combat noise can be maximally disruptive, as it is unpredictable, highly 
variable, and of high intensity, however quantitative models of performance decrement 
due to extraordinary noise are not yet available (Ref. 3).  
 
3.3.4  Vibration 
 
Whole-body vibration, if of sufficient magnitude, can have serious performance effects 
on soldiers. For example, the tolerance limit for accelerations of 3 m/s2 at 5 Hz is one 
minute, while at 0.3 m/s2 at the same frequency is 8 hours. For complete curves showing 
the relationship between acceleration, frequency, and tolerance limits, see Ref. 10. 
 
At very low frequencies, less than 0.5 Hz, motion sickness occurs. At 30 Hz, the resonant 
frequency of the eyes, vision is disrupted. Multimodal displays, using tactile and auditory 
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redundancy have been used to make up for the performance decrement in using visual 
displays alone in high vibration environments. Manual control of input devices, such as 
cursors, buttons, and vehicular controls can also be negatively impacted by low frequency 
vibrations (Ref. 11).  
 
Low-frequency vibration, combined with being confined in a visually restricting vehicle 
(e.g. tank or armored personnel carrier), have had disastrous effects on soldiers’ abilities 
to use computer displays and perform combat tasks upon leaving the vehicle, due to 
motion induced sickness. Recent US Army studies have attempted to quantify the 
detrimental effects of being “on the move” while working with computer display systems 
in C2Vs and other vehicles (Ref. 11). The authors report a substantial degradation in 
individual and task performance while “on the move” and working at the four 
workstations in the back of the vehicle (See Ref. 12 for more details). The degradation 
would also carry over to many tasks performed immediately after being released from the 
confines of the vehicle. 
 
There are some findings that vibration can negatively impact cognitive functions. 
Sherwood and Griffin (Ref. 13) discovered differences in rates of learning between static 
and vibrated groups, while Schipani et al. (Ref. 14) saw decrements in time sharing, 
memorization, inductive reasoning, attention, and spatial orientation after rides in a 
modified M113. 
 
3.3.5  Terrain and Altitude 
 
While anecdotal evidence would suggest that terrain and altitude play important roles in 
workload, there are no available literary sources verifying the effects of these two 
environmental stressors for the general infantry soldier. FM1-100 supplies us with 
valuable advice for operating Army helicopters in different terrains, including mountains, 
jungles, deserts, arctic areas, urban terrain, and nuclear/biological/chemical (NBC) 
environments (Ref. 15). 
 
We know that at high altitudes (above 3,000 m), there is less oxygen and resulting 
hypoxia can be a problem. We also know that at very high altitudes (above 6,000 m) even 
highly trained mountain climbers can experience high-altitude pulmonary edema (HAPE) 
and high-altitude cerebral edema (HACE). However, these conditions are not those 
experienced by the typical US Army soldier. Difficult terrain, such as deserts, swamps, 
jungles, and mountains require more effort to traverse, however it is assumed that 
leadership would account for increased time and effort by providing mechanized 
transport or allowing more time and rest periods in difficult terrain. 
 
3.3.6  Night Operations 
 
In the past, before the development of night-vision goggles (NVG), operations conducted 
after dusk until before dawn were much more difficult to perform than daytime 
operations, i.e. they take longer to complete and more errors are committed. While the 
NVG technology has closed the gap considerably, the technology has not completely 
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compensated for the effect of no or little ambient light. Assuming they are available for 
use, the NVGs amplify ambient light to where a user can perform adequately, however, 
the limited field of view, limited range, tracing effects, lack of detail and color contrast, 
bulk, and significant eye strain limit performance to that somewhat lower than using 
natural ambient light.  
 
3.3.7  Toxic Substances 
 
On the battlefield, if toxic substances are used as weapons, we can probably assume that 
one of three responses will occur: The toxin will be absorbed and the soldier will be 
severely incapacitated; the toxin will miss the soldier and no/mild negative effects will 
ensue; the soldier will successfully don the protective gear prior to exposure and his 
performance will suffer mostly due to wearing the NBC gear. Experimental findings on 
the effects of the NBC gear range from no decrement to the complete inability to perform 
any task directly (Ref. 8). The major stressors include the heat build-up inside the suit, 
which exacerbates fatigue and reduces the soldier’s ability to think, maintain vigilance, 
and make decisions. Due to the heavy gloves, tasks requiring manual dexterity are 
severely compromised, as the gloves cannot be removed even for short periods. 
Additionally, the facemasks reduce peripheral vision and visual acuity when in place 
(Ref. 16).  
 
3.4  Internal PSFs 
 
As mentioned earlier, internal PSFs comprise those that originate inside the human, 
including intelligence, cognitive styles, expertise, cultural values, personality, emotional 
factors, and preferences. These and others will be considered in terms of impact on 
performance and typical modeling approaches. 
 
3.4.1 Intelligence 
 
The Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) is used to place recruits into mental-
performance categories, ranging from Category I to Category V (high to low). The AFQT 
has been used to assign recruits into compatible jobs and evaluate correlations between 
scores and performance on selected military tasks or job performance. Studies of M-60  
and M-1 tankers have demonstrated a general decline in target hits in gunnery exercises 
as mental category declined. Automation has been attributed to bolstering performance of 
the tankers with lower categories in the M-1 (Ref. 3).  
 
3.4.2  Perceptual Processes 
 
Few articles exist treating perceptual processes as model parameters for computer 
modeling of soldiers. However, Ritter and Avaraamides (Ref. 4) suggest that “perceptual 
processes allow another area for individual differences and for short term effects” (pg. 
12). They break out 5 visual- perception factors that could affect military field 
performance:  
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1. Attention to objects moving in the periphery – notice moving objects faster 
2. Size of visual field – notice stationary objects faster 
3. Perceptual accuracy – helps to find searched-for objects faster 
4. Scan speed – targets found more quickly 
5. Interpretation of ambiguous stimuli – may be linked to level of anxiety 
 
However, no statement as to the quantitative effects of these factors has been offered, as 
is the case with many of the sources cited in this report. 
 
3.4.3  Expertise and Experience 
 
All branches of the US Armed Forces spend inordinate amounts of time and money 
ensuring that soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines get adequate training prior to 
performing combat activities, operating technical equipment, or maintaining technical 
equipment. How effective the training is and how long it remains effective is anybody’s 
guess. A few members of the Army Science Board visited Sandia in 2001 and gave a 
briefing that included a graph indicating how long training remained effective. It 
indicated how quickly things learned in training were forgotten if not practiced or put into 
regular use. It looked something like Fig. 2. Following the up-slope of learning is a 
characteristic down-slope of forgetting, which in many cases is nearly as steep as the 
learning curve.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Typical graph showing Army task proficiency during and after training. 
 
 
Figure 2 demonstrates the worth of having experienced soldiers in the ranks, who have 
performed their combat tasks many times over a prolonged period. A similarly shaped 
curve is found in Ref. 8, however, the x-axis represents “Days in Combat,” ranging from 
0 to 30, with peak performance occurring between 10 and 20 days. The curve is 
explained as the “new guy factor,” where it takes about 10 days for replacement troops to 
adjust to battle conditions, get oriented, and adapt to the initial high state of fear. After 
about 3 weeks, the troops begin to get overcome by fatigue and without rest or 
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replacement become totally incapacitated. These data were observed in the Korean 
Conflict. 
 
3.4.4  Emotions 
 
Eva Hudlicka has written extensively on PSFs associated with individual differences in 
affective mental states and their impact on cognition (Ref. 17). She concentrates on three 
emotional states; anxiety, obsessiveness, and depression. She reports that anxiety tends to 
narrow the focus of attention, can predispose towards the detection of threatening stimuli, 
and predisposes towards the interpretation of ambiguous stimuli as dangerous. Factors 
that can increase anxiety in mentally-healthy commanders include isolation of the 
platoon/company, inadequate time to make decisions, loss of resources or personnel, and 
vulnerability to the enemy. An anxious leader can overestimate the danger in his situation 
and make the following command errors: a) commit too many resources or men to a 
battle, b) choose an overly conservative course of action, or c) interpret signals as 
approaching enemy and open fire too early.  
 
High obsessiveness, characterized as “checking” behavior, tends to lower confidence in 
one’s attentional abilities to capture salient features in the environment, narrow 
conceptual categories, decrease memory for previous actions, slow decision-making 
speed, and reduce confidence in one’s own capability to distinguish between past events 
and those that are planned or imagined. Obsessive leaders tend to: a) micromanage, 
which can lead to inefficiencies and bottlenecks in communication, b) not trust incoming 
information about the approaching enemy and wait too long before initiating action, c) 
rehearse more thoroughly, which if time permits, can lead to increased success.  
 
Depression has an impact on memory, in that it can enhance the recall of negative 
experiences, including negative self-appraisals. It also has the effect of lowering 
estimates of degree of control in particular inference tasks. Depressed leaders tend to: be 
less optimistic about outcomes of their decisions, and b) overestimate the likelihood of 
losing critical equipment, and c) consequently employ overly conservative strategies.  
 
3.4.5  Personality 
 
Personality has been studied since the dawn of the science of psychology, however recent 
simplifications in modeling personality have taken root in the last 10-15 years. Janis and 
Mann (Ref. 18) have put forth the view that personality variables, along with situational 
factors, have important influences on decision-making behavior. According to Pew and 
Mavor (Ref. 3), more recently, a five- factor theory has become popular (Ref. 19). Janis 
(Ref. 20) suggests that only three of the five factors are essential in predicting and 
understanding command behavior; openness, conscientiousness, and neuroticism. 
Openness has the following characteristics: curious, broad interests, creative, original, 
imaginative, and untraditional. Conscientiousness is characterized by: being organized, 
reliable, hard-working, self-disciplined, honest, and clean. Neuroticism embodies 
worrying, nervousness, emotionality, insecurity, inadequacy, and hypochondria. These 
and other personality traits can be determined simply by having subjects fill out 
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questionnaires. One study claimed that conscientiousness was the strongest personality 
predictor of success in the military.  
 
Ritter and Avraamides (Ref. 4) suggest four personality factors that can moderate 
military performance. Stability moderates other personality factors so that the more stable 
individuals experience smaller changes in the following personality factors. Individuals 
with more humor are able to absorb and dissipate their own and others losses and shocks, 
at least temporarily. Acquiescence, or the willingness to follow orders, varies between 
individuals and leads groups to perform differently. Eagerness, or the willingness to take 
on tasks, can lead to problems if someone is too eager, as in a false-courage situation. 
Unfortunately, the source authors do not offer any quantitative estimates of how these 
personality traits might impact military-task performance. In our application, it might be 
valuable to know how these various traits statistically occur in a normal population of 
military recruits. 
 
3.4.6  Cultural Values 
 
Little research exists on the impact of cultural values and nationality on military 
performance. However, some research findings from a multinational firm in 67 nation-
states suggest that four major dimensions emerge from factor analysis; power distance, 
uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity/femininity. Of these, power 
distance, or the degree to which societies stress status hierarchies, is interpreted as a 
characteristic of the culture, rather than of the individual-differences dimension. One 
potential implication of this is that adherence to formal chain of command will be 
enforced more rigorously in a high power-distance culture (Ref. 3). The authors suggest 
that one might also infer that the amount of discussion of tactical orders would be 
minimal. They also cite Brown (Ref. 21), who suggests that risk-taking behavior is much 
more valued in Western Europe and North American societies than in cultures from other 
parts of the world. 
 
 3.5  Task-Based PSFs 
 
As mentioned briefly above, task-specific PSFs include task history, location of 
engagement, boredom, stress, threats, casualty level, task type, availability of on-site task 
training, interface quality, task-related fatigue, battle conditions, and local casualties. 
 
3.5.1  Casualty Level 
 
Unfortunately, no models have been found that account for the fitness of the soldier or 
level of injury incurred during battle. There must be an unwritten assumption in the 
military that soldiers are either present or ready for battle or are “casualties” and 
unavailable. However, for our purposes, there may be circumstances where a soldier is 
injured during battle, but still capable of performing limited tasks. For example, a limb 
injury or flesh wound might not prevent a soldier from being able to drive a vehicle, fire a 
weapon from a protected site, or operate a radio at a command post. If we want a casualty 
model, we’ll have to build our own. Perhaps a three or four-level model would suffice, 
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where levels one and four would be fully fit and injured enough to be removed from 
battle, and levels two and three would be unable to communicate and immobilized. 
 
3.5.2  Task and Combat-Related Physical Fatigue 
 
While last year’s report (Ref. 2) addressed soldier cognitive fatigue due to lack of rest or 
sleep in a military engagement, it did not specifically address physical fatigue related to 
the type of task being performed. Workers, foremen, and researchers have known since 
prehistoric times that heavy work produces more physical fatigue than light work or rest. 
Depending on the type of work being performed, the amount of time someone can 
perform the work before exhaustion is reached varies. Combat tasks vary in the intensity 
of physical work required. Generic models have been developed for combat, based on 
data collected in World War II and the Arab-Israeli wars. As reported in Ref. 3, Dupuy 
modeled fatigue as the degradation of ability to produce casualties at different battle 
intensities. For a unit in contact with the enemy 80 percent of the time, degradation was 7 
percent per day. If the unit was in combat between 50 and 80 percent of the time, 
degradation was 2 percent per day. Recovery, during non-combat periods, was 
determined to be 6 percent (improvement) per day. In the early 1980s the Army Research 
Institute developed PERFECT, a model that determines the performance effectiveness for 
combat troops in a small unit. It combined a task analysis of military tasks with 
laboratory research on sleep deprivation, noise, visual acuity, and reasoning abilities 
(Ref. 3). The model and simulation are described in Ref. 22. 
 
3.5.3  Task History 
 
The previous experience the soldier has had with the task (especially complex tasks such 
as fault diagnosis and problem solving) can influence attitude toward it and ultimate 
success/failure and time to perform. After many successful same or similar task 
completions, the soldier is confident of his/her performance aptitude, and has a higher 
likelihood of performing the current task to satisfaction. Alternatively, after failure, the 
soldier will likely be more conservative and less likely to attempt risky actions, even if 
they are routine for other more successful task performers. The success/failure ratio can 
moderate the mood, motivation, and decision process of the performer (Ref. 3). 
 
3.5.4  Boredom (Low Stress) 
 
Prolonged exposure to a task that contains no frequent changes (such as watching a radar 
screen in peacetime) will increase reaction time when an event does occur. This is often 
called the “vigilance effect” and can occur very soon after a boring vigilance task has 
begun. Soldiers typically can get very drowsy or fall asleep during tasks such guarding a 
facility or camp at night. In stress models, this is the point below optimal stress, where 
the soldier is not stimulated enough to perform tasks adequately (Ref. 3). Similarly, if 
troops are deployed to a forward position with no combat action, waiting for extended 
periods (weeks or even a few days) can cause recently trained troops to become bored, 
lose their fighting edge, and often cause a reduction in discipline.  
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3.5.5  Location of Engagement 
 
Soldiers will typically be more passionate, motivated, and willing to risk his/her life 
when the task is to protect his/her own country than to defend another’s in a remote 
location (Ref. 3). 
 
3.5.6  Threat Level and Local Casualties 
 
Factors such as knowledge of the size and skill of the opposing force, its proximity, and 
the direct or immediate threat to self and associates in battle can promote the fear 
emotion and anxious or panic behavior in soldiers whose level of training does not 
overcome these natural responses. Local casualties, especially comrades witnessed 
getting seriously injured or killed, can increase anxiety or depression to levels of virtual 
incapacitation. 
 
3.5.7  Quality of Technology Interfaces 
 
In combat, where stress levels can be very high, it is important that user interfaces to 
technological gear be intuitive, i.e. follow the best ergonomic practices. The reason being 
that recently learned information will be forgotten in high-stress situations, and the users 
will revert to what that which they expect or are habitually accustomed. Specialized 
training, if not reinforced by active use over a significant period of time, can be 
temporarily forgotten and mistakes can be made. The US military has requirements for 
and spends millions ensuring that their systems are ergonomically designed and fully 
integrated before testing and purchasing, however occasionally a poorly designed system 
interface can sneak through with the promise of intensive training, which can overcome 
(at least temporarily) an unintuitive interface. Consequently, while ergonomic problems 
are rare, some systems may incur the effect of decreased performance due to poor 
human-system interfaces. 
 
3.5.8  Task Difficulty 
 
Whether immersed in combat or working in a safe repair depot, task difficulty almost 
always affects task performance. Difficult cognitive tasks, such as problem solving, fault 
diagnosis, navigation through unfamiliar terrain, and strategic decision-making are 
difficult to perform with high reliability. Simple cognitive tasks, such as counting men, 
looking for someone, listening to orders, firing a rifle at a target, and performing a routine 
repair procedure on a vehicle can be performed with much higher reliability. Even simple 
tasks, if prolonged or if consisting of many steps, can be erroneously or slowly 
performed, if appropriate job aids (e.g. written procedures, checklists) are not used. 
Technicians and mechanics, if left to their own preferences, often use a written procedure 
once in performing a new task, and rely on memory for subsequent performances. 
However, in high-consequence operations, such as nuclear-weapon assembly, written 
procedures, checklists, and frequent inspections are enforced to be mandatory in every 
instance. 
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3.5.9  On-Site Training 
 
If a soldier needs to perform an unfamiliar task on a piece of gear, any training is better 
than none. The military is developing technologies to deliver on-site training and mission 
rehearsal when the need arises. The recency of on-site training can make it very effective, 
especially if the training is followed immediately by successful task completion.  
 
3.5.10  High Cognitive Workload 
 
Cognitive workload is a difficult parameter to define. It is generally understood as a 
psychological stress due to inability to cope with a difficult task or an overload of 
information. It is based on attentional and cognitive-capacity limitations, which limit the 
success and speed of performing difficult or multiple tasks. Some define workload as the 
portion of the operator’s limited capacity actually required to perform a particular task. 
Others define it as the difference between the capacities of the information processing 
system that are required for task performance and the capacity available for other tasks. 
The result of high cognitive workload is usually a detrimental effect of performance on 
any of the tasks and limiting the potential of adding new tasks or taking in new 
information. Workload can also be affected by other PSFs, such as environmental factors, 
knowledge, experience, intelligence, skills, etc (Ref. 23). Lundin (Ref. 24) found 
differences in how tankers took firing positions, detected targets, target prioritization, 
depending on high and low cognitive workload. In each case the performance was 
superior under low workload conditions. For example, in selecting firing positions, 
tankers selected the best protection, field-of-fire, and distance under low workload, and 
simply took the nearest position under high workload. In detecting targets, it took 6 
seconds from detection until the gunner had it in-sight under low workload, and 10 
seconds under high workload. Similar time differences pertained to detecting new targets 
after hitting a target. Also, under high workload, crews fired upon the closest target, 
while under low workload, the most dangerous target was selected. 
 
3.5.11  Stress Level 
 
Stress is the physiological response elicited by environmental stressors, perceived threats, 
social pressures, task difficulty, limited task completion time, lack of personal 
confidence, and many other factors. When optimal, stress can be a positive motivator for 
good performance. However, when it reaches levels higher than optimal, performance is 
almost universally degraded. Although soldiers are trained to perform under high levels 
of stressors, actual combat conditions can push even very good soldiers into high stress 
levels, where performance is degraded. At extremely high levels, as can be experienced 
in intense combat, stress can virtually incapacitate an individual from performing 
required tasks and incurring casualties among the enemy. Some modelers have such high 
regard for stress as a PSF they have used it as a multiplier for coincident PSFs, such as 
training and task difficulty. Swain and Guttmann, formerly at Sandia Labs (Ref. 23), 
developed a multiplicative model involving stress level (task load), task complexity, and 
skill level for nuclear power plant operators (see Table 1.).  
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Table 1. Behavior-moderation factors for human error probabilities based on 
stress level, task difficulty and worker skill level (Swain and Guttmann, 1983). 
 
Stress Level Task Difficulty Skilled Worker Novice Worker
Very Low  x2 x2 
Optimal step-by-step x1 x1 
 dynamic x1 x2 
Moderately High step-by-step x2 x4 
 dynamic x5 x10 
Extremely High step-by-step x5 x10 
 dynamic use 0.25 use 0.50 
 
 
The factors in the last two columns indicate the multiplier to be applied to the probability 
of human error of commission in nuclear–power plant operations. This model is one of 
the few quantitative models extant that addresses interactions of multiple PSFs on task 
performance.  
 
3.5.12  Missing PSFs 
 
In addition to the PSFs listed above, there appear to be some that the literature completely 
ignores. One is hunger. The author spoke with a veteran Special Forces soldier recently 
and he said things get very different when one is in combat when hungry—which is a lot 
of the time. The author assumes that the reason he cannot find anything written on hunger 
in combat is because after the invention of vacuum canning meat for the Napoleonic 
campaigns, Western armies have generally been very well fed, except for campaigns of 
attrition. 
 
Another apparently missing PSF is wearing a heavy backpack. We know that US Army 
and Marines soldiers often carry packs, weighing upwards of 80 pounds. We also know 
that our soldiers are in good shape and can carry the weight, but how does it affect 
combat performance? Does it slow movement, restrict hand-to-hand combat proficiency, 
or impact marksmanship? 
 
3.6  Summary of Effects of PSFs on Military Tasks 
 
In the interest of estimating the impact of PSFs on a representative set of military tasks, a 
matrix was prepared with PSFs along the y-axis (row names) and tasks along the x axis 
(column names). Representative military tasks were collected from documentation on the 
anticipated Unit of Action (UA) complement of personnel and platforms, and grouped 
into the categories: Concept of Operations Situation Understanding, Mobility, 
Survivability, Operability, and Lethality. These categories relate closely to measures of 
effectiveness (MOEs) for the SoSAT software. Within categories, representative tasks 
were chosen from the 10 most numerously represented military occupational specialties 
(MOS) classifications for Future Combat System (FCS) Brigade Combat Team (BCT). 
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These MOS classifications represent approximately 45 percent of the UA force of 3285 
men and women. The matrix was first filled out by the author using information found in 
the preceding sections and four assumed levels of detrimental effects; no effect, mildly 
detrimental, moderately detrimental, and severely detrimental. The four levels were 
graphically depicted in the matrix using a background color and three different hue 
variants of the color red, as shown in Figure 3. Later, two subject-matter experts (SMEs) 
with military experience filled out a blank matrix. The complete matrix data can be found 
in Appendix A. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MOEs COP / Situation Understanding 
Generic Tasks :  
Follow 
Briefing/Orders 
Make 
Strategic 
Decisions 
Analyze 
Intelligence 
Operate
Comms 
An
Te
PSFs V V V V 
Inernal PSFs           
Emotions:           
     Obsessiveness           
     Anxiety          
     Depression           
     Fear/High Threat Level           
Inadequate Experience           
Inadequate 
Training/Expertise           
Low Intelligence/Cognitive 
Throughput           
Poor Perceptual Processing           
Low Problem Solving Skills           
Personality:           
     Low Openness           
     Low Conscientiousness           
     High Neuroticism           
     Low Stability           
     Little Humor           
     Low Acqiescence           
     Low Eagerness           
Different Cultural Values           
Hunger - significant           
Figure 3. Partial Matrix of PSFs and Typical Military Tasks. The 47 
PSFs are listed down the left-hand side of the matrix (along with 
categorical headers in gray) representing rows. The 22 military tasks are 
listed across the top of the columns. For every combination of PSF and 
task, one of four colors is inserted, representing the severity of effect. The 
default background color (in this case light blue) represents no effect, rose 
represents small negative effect, magenta represents moderate negative 
effect, and bright red represents severe negative effect. 
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3.6.1  SME Matrix Results 
 
Two SMEs with military experience filled out the whole 1034-cell matrix (see Appendix 
A). Brief biographical sketches of the two SMEs follow:  
 
Major “X” is an officer in the U.S. Army Reserves. His active duty experience 
includes command of a Special Forces Detachment (A-Team) and 5 deployments 
to the CENTCOM AOR. He is a graduate of the United States Military 
Academy. 
 
Sergeant “Y” is a former United States Marine and veteran of the current conflict 
in Iraq. He served in Iraq from the beginning of the war until September of 2003. 
In his role as an Arabic translator, Sgt. Y worked with many different units all 
over the battlefield, but his primary mission was conducting battlefield 
interrogations on the front line. 
 
Neither SME discussed the literature findings on PSFs with anyone from the project. 
Each was e-mailed the instructions shown in Appendix B. On the first attempt, Major X 
filled out the matrix with mostly bright red. After explaining to him that we needed 
variation in the responses so that we could judge which ones were the most important, he 
resubmitted the matrix with a wider range of responses. 
 
Each SME’s completed matrix was analyzed for PSFs that had the most cumulative 
negative impact on the 22 military tasks. A score for each PSF was calculated by adding 
the number of rose responses with two times the number of magenta responses and three 
times the number of bright red responses. The highest ten scoring PSFs for each SME 
were then listed in descending order, along with the results from the literature (see Figure 
4.) While almost perfect correspondence was achieved between the literature and 
Sergeant Y (9 out of 10), less correspondence was achieved with Major X (6 out of 10). 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Top ten PSFs from SME’s data and the literature. 
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4. Interactions of Multiple PSFs 
 
Rarely does a soldier going into combat experience only one PSF at any given time, but 
experiences numerous PSFs, especially as the combat continues for a significant time 
period and fatigue and other factors accumulate. Given this rational appraisal of combat 
situations, we would expect previous modeling efforts to have taken the many possible 
interactions of PSFs into account in their modeling. By interactions, we mean the 
combinatorial effects of two or more factors, which is more (or less) than a summation or 
additive relationship. However, we find very few instances where interactions are 
acknowledged, much less modeled. Exceptions are noted in the following section. 
 
4.1 Interactions Discussed in the Literature 
 
Van Nostrand (Ref. 8) developed a multiplicative model of three factors, noting that an 
additive model would have been less conservative. The factors modeled were from three 
different types—internal, external, and task-related: average soldier mental category 
(IIIA), participation in sustained operations of 24 hours, and experiencing high heat in 
combat for 7 hours. The model compared combinations of the three factors with a base 
case of 100 % of expected hits. The mental category reduced performance to 85%; the 
sustained operations reduced it to approximately 65%; and the 7 hours of high heat 
reduced performance to about 10%. All three combined reduced performance to about 
5%. No data were acquired to validate the model, and no additional combinations of 
factors were modeled in the report.  
 
Ritter and Avaraamides (Ref. 4) provide a table in which specific combinations of PSFs 
are combined with brief discussions of effects and examples. For example, the combined 
effects of noise (external factor) and anxiety (internal or task-related) are the following: 
 
“Effects: Increase selectivity in attention especially in dual tasks. Anxiety 
produces no improvement in main-task performance while noise does. 
Both noise and anxiety reduce secondary-task performance. Anxiety may 
also lead to overestimating potential danger. 
 
Example: A soldier has two tasks; to track the enemy position and monitor 
the layout of his teammates. A highly anxious leader…will perform better 
in the main task (i.e. monitor enemy) but worse on monitoring his fellow 
soldiers. In the presence of noise in the environment his performance on 
both primary and secondary task[s] will decrease. An anxious leader may 
also overestimate potential danger and commit to a task an unnecessary 
number of troops and resources.” Pg. 18. 
 
Perhaps the reason so little is written on modeling interactions of PSFs is that the 
factorial experiments have not been conducted, and when it comes to combat behaviors, 
it would be impossible due to ethical reasons. Silverman, as quoted in Ref. 22 states that: 
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“As soon as one tries to integrate across PSFs and synthesize the 
Integrated Stress…, one rapidly departs from grounded theories and enters 
into the realm of informed opinion”. Pg. 12 
 
Nevertheless, as Swain and Guttmann (Ref. 23) have shown, informed opinion is what 
researchers can provide prior to the definitive experiment being performed. Swain has 
told the author that experience in reviewing nuclear-power plant accidents and 
developing human-reliability analyses of same led to the interactive stress model and that 
subsequent field operations data have informally validated the model that he and 
Guttmann developed. 
 
4.2 Other Likely Interactions 
 
As another means of categorizing PSFs, several researchers in the field have made the 
distinction between PSFs that change during the task (or, in our case, during combat), and 
those that do not. Looking at the three general categories we’ve established, most of the 
internal PSFs don’t really change during any given battle, which might take anywhere 
from a few days to several weeks. The exception is emotion, which can change quickly as 
the result of a turning point in a battle, getting wounded, or seeing colleagues get maimed 
or killed.  
 
By and large, however, external and task-based PSFs can change quickly in a given 
battle, by their very nature and they can combine in non-additive ways. For example, if it 
were to begin raining in a forest or rocky terrain, military operations would not be as 
severely affected as if it happened in an area with loose dirt and no vegetation, which 
could create serious mud underfoot, thus hampering troops movement and vehicle 
operations. This kind of interaction exacerbates the negative effects of the two factors 
taken in isolation, making the resultant combination worse than their simple additive 
effects. Because they affect performance in the same direction, we’ll call them positive 
interactions for this discussion. Similar positive interactions can be presumed for high 
winds and sandy desert terrain, cold and vibration, toxic substances and night operations, 
noise and fatigue, inexperience and fatigue, etc. Some PSFs can combine in ways that 
tend to cancel or negate each other’s effects. We can call these negative interactions for 
this discussion. Although these tend to be rare, examples would be anxiety and fatigue, 
rain and toxic gases, and wind and excessive heat. Because we are modeling PSFs that 
reduce soldier performance from an assumed 100 percent, we will not attempt to model 
the negative interactions in this report. 
 
Attempts will be made in the next fiscal year to collect data from our subject-matter 
experts concerning the effects of combinations of PSFs on representative military tasks. 
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Appendix A (approx. 12 pages) 
 
Major X Matrix.xls  
 
Sergeant Y Matrix.xls  
 
Literature Matrix.xls  
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Appendix B 
 
Matrix form-filling instructions, which were e-mailed to the SMEs: 
 
Here is the matrix we spoke of on the phone. It has behavior moderators, or Performance 
Shaping Factors (PSFs) down the left-hand column, and typical military tasks across the 
top. The tasks are categorized into Measures of Effectiveness (MOEs), but don’t pay any 
attention to that. Some of the PSF lines (rows) are gray, indicating they are headers for 
what follows immediately below (indented), and don’t need to be filled out. The three 
main categories of PSF are shown in bright colors and don’t need to be filled out either. 
 
We added an example of how to fill it out in the first column. The repeated columns 
listing the PSFs are there for visual convenience only—so you don’t have to scroll across 
the screen. The existing background colors differ only to visually separate the MOEs 
across the top of the columns. 
 
Please leave the cells the original color if the PSF has no effect. We assume a soldier is at 
100 percent with no negative effects from the PSFs. Select Rose fill for mild negative 
effect (10-30 percent decrement), plum for moderate negative effect (35-65 percent 
decrement), and red for severe negative effect (70-100 percent decrement).  
 
We found when filling out the matrix, that there are some tasks that are similar enough 
(at least initially in our minds) to cut and paste from an already filled out column. 
However, these were very few, and when we went down the pasted column, not all of the 
colors were appropriate for the new task. So if you use this technique, please review all of 
the cells for the new task and make the changes necessary. We found that no columns 
ended up matching any other columns exactly. 
 
We purposely did not define the tasks in any detail so that you could use your experience 
to recall what they consisted of. If you are not familiar with the task, give it your best 
guess. All of the tasks were extracted from MOS documentation for the following: 
 
Infantrymen 11B10, 11B20, 11B30 
Medical specialist 68W10 
Petrol and Water Supply 92F10 
Cavalry Scout 19D10 
Canon Crew 13B10 
Armor Crew 19K10, 19K20 
 
We assumed that a commanding officer was making the “strategic decisions.” 
 
Results may vary, but when we filled out the matrix using the literature as our guide, it 
took several 2-hour sessions to get through it all. We recommend you don’t try to do it all 
in one sitting, as cognitive fatigue may throw off your consistency. Feel free to go back 
and change your previous answers, if it will help you to be more consistent. 
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